

# Advisory Circular

Subject: Aviation Security Service

Organisations — Certification

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**GENERAL:** Civil Aviation Authority Advisory Circulars (AC) contain information about standards, practices, and procedures that the Authority has found to be acceptable for compliance with the associated Civil Aviation Rule (CAR). Consideration will be given to other methods of compliance which may be presented to the Authority. When new standards, practices, or procedures are found to be acceptable they will be added to the appropriate AC.

Each reference to a number in this AC, such as 140.15, is a reference to a specific rule within Part 140

**PURPOSE:** This AC provides methods acceptable to the Director for showing compliance with Part 140.

**CANCELLATION:** There was no previous issue, so there is no cancellation.

**FOCUS:** This material is intended for assisting holders of and applicants for an Aviation Security Service Certificate.

**RELATED CAR:** This AC relates specifically to CAR Part 140.

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# Subpart A — General

#### 140.3 Definitions

Each definition that appears under this rule is considered necessary for this Part alone. There are also applicable definitions contained within Part 1.

## 140.5 Certificate required

Part 140 requires that all organisations wishing to provide aviation security services at a security designated aerodrome or security designated navigation installation, including the Aviation Security Service established by the Authority, must be certificated in accordance with Part 140.

It must be noted that all references to an aviation security service provider and the requirements for those organisations also apply to the Aviation Security Service.

## **Subpart B — Certification Requirements**

#### 140.51 Personnel requirements

The organisation is required to nominate a person to be identified as the Chief Executive. This person must have overall authority within the organisation, including financial authority, to ensure that all the necessary resources are available to provide the services for which the organisation is certificated and to ensure compliance with the procedures in its exposition.

The senior persons nominated in the exposition must be acceptable to the Director. These senior persons are required to be suitably qualified for the position held and must be responsible for the provision for, operation of, and the maintenance of all services and facilities specified in the exposition. In particular they should;

- (a) Ensure that there is established, at the aerodrome, an aviation security programme in accordance with Annex 17 to the Chicago Convention sufficient to protect international civil aviation from unlawful interference.
- (b) Be responsible to ensure that the aviation security service provider's responsibilities under the Civil Aviation Act 1990 are complied with and for the overall supervision of aviation security officers at the aerodrome.
- (c) Be responsible for ensuring all the tasks and obligations in Part 140, for which the organisation has been certificated, are adequately complied with.

Supervising staff are responsible for the supervision of aviation security staff in operational work, and carry out administrative and staff duties for the unit. In particular they should check and supervise the work of junior supervisors to ensure that all administrative, security and safety tasks are being properly discharged to the standards specified in the organisation's exposition.

Supervising staff are also responsible for the supervision of all aviation security officers under their control, and dealing with aviation security matters either of a routine or of an emergency nature. In particular they should ensure that sufficient staff are on duty at all times to discharge prime aviation security tasks, and arrange daily staff duties to ensure that the most effective cover practicable is given to the tasks and obligations in compliance with Part 140.

Sufficient numbers of aviation security officers must be employed to adequately carry out the services proposed in the organisation's exposition.

The service provider may choose to appoint managers for all or any combination of the above areas of responsibility, however it must be clear to whom responsibilities devolve. It is necessary, in any case, that these managers report to and are responsible to the Chief Executive.

The persons so nominated are to be identified on Form CAA 24140/01 and credentials supplied with the application. To be accepted, such nominated persons should have adequate knowledge and satisfactory experience relative to their position and responsibility.

The organisation needs to establish pre-qualifications standards for personnel it intends to recruit. These standards will ensure that the trainees have a reasonable chance of successfully completing any course, are suitable for the type of tasks to be undertaken and are medically acceptable.

To help in the assessment of competence it is recommended that job descriptions are formulated for all positions within the organisation.

## **APPENDIX A** — Aviation Security Standards

#### Supplementary information

The ICAO "Security Manual for Safeguarding Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference", (Doc. 8973—Restricted) gives an in-depth guidance for recommended practises and procedures that may be implemented by an Aviation Security Service Organisation.

The New Zealand National Aviation Security Programme amplifies the requirements of this Part and will assist with the document procedures required under this Part.

#### A.1 Sterile area search

The purpose of a sterile search is to thoroughly examine the area from the screening point to the aircraft for unauthorised articles to ensure that persons who have been screened do not gain access to unauthorised articles that have been left hidden in the sterile area.

A thorough search of the sterile area must be carried out to ensure no unauthorised article has been left or hidden therein. All such searches are to be carried out any time when the sterile nature of the area may have been compromised and in any event prior to the commencement of a period of passenger screening.

## A.2 Security control of sterile areas

Concessionaires in the concourse, after the screening point, should not offer for sale or supply any article which it is prohibited to carry on an aircraft unless special arrangements for its sale have been made.

No operator should operate an international commercial air transport service unless all passengers travelling on board that aircraft have been subject to screening to ensure that no unauthorised article is carried on that aircraft or passed to any person after such screening.

The purpose of monitoring persons after screening is to ensure they do not have access to unauthorised articles.

Aviation security personnel should be rostered to carry out surveillance for this purpose.

#### A.3 Aircraft search

No operator may operate an international commercial air transport service unless the aircraft is checked to ensure that no unauthorised article, not being part of approved equipment, has been left or placed on board.

Any aircraft being prepared for a flight that is deemed, for any reason, to be "high risk" should be subjected to a full anti-sabotage search by security personnel with the aircraft operator's engineering assistance. The search should be carried out in a planned manner using the aircraft's search list. These searches are to be of sufficient intensity to discover any unauthorised articles that may have been left, or placed, on board.

In normal circumstances where the aircraft has not been identified as a high-risk flight, and has been subjected to normal international security procedures, a check of the cabin and the flight deck of the aircraft by the crew as required under Part 108 (standard airline security programme) requirements will be sufficient. This same requirement will apply where the aircraft has been kept in a secure environment while undergoing engineering or other maintenance checks.

When a search of the aircraft by security personnel is required, it must be carried out in such a manner as to ensure no unauthorised article has been concealed or otherwise introduced on board. The search may be carried out by personnel and/or with the aid of canine, electronic or mechanical means.

In normal or routine searches, as a minimum, the search will involve the checking of the flight deck, overhead lockers, floor areas, toilets, galleys and receptacles, and other areas to which passengers on previous services could have had ready access. These searches are to be of sufficient intensity to discover any unauthorised articles that may have been left, or placed, in those areas of the aircraft.

Security personnel carrying out the search of an aircraft cabin of an ex-unscreened service, must do so in a planned manner. They must ensure that all places reasonably accessible to previous passengers or other persons are thoroughly searched for any unauthorised articles that may have been left or concealed on board.

### A.4 Screening point security and equipment

The security provided must be sufficient to prevent any person by-passing the screening point without being screened.

Screening points must be situated so that every person entering any sterile area from any public area passes through them.

The organisation must ensure that sufficient personnel and equipment is available to carry out screening at such a speed that standards can be maintained without the departure of the aircraft being unnecessarily delayed. The organisation must ensure that uplifted items suitable for carriage on board an aircraft are passed to the airline concerned for carriage as hold stowed baggage.

The organisation must have procedures for ongoing inspection and testing of equipment, materials and facilities. The inspection and testing of equipment, materials and facilities must be carried out to ensure that they are performing to manufacturer's standards prior to each period of usage.

X-ray examination equipment should be capable of detecting a 24-gauge wire under step 5 of a standard step-wedge system. It should be film safe for 1000 ASA film or below and handle all baggage with dimensions according to IATA regulations. It should have radiation safety values not exceeding those laid down in the Radiation Protection Act 1965 and any Regulations made under this Act, and should automatically shut down if the operating level of radiation is exceeded.

Where any equipment is suspected of having any fault, it is to be inspected and passed as serviceable by technicians before that equipment is again used in an operational mode.

Standard test pieces must be used for testing and calibrating screening equipment. Standard test pieces should be assessed for their suitability at regular intervals. The test pieces must be of a density and size to ensure the equipment is calibrated to detect all unauthorised articles.

When X-ray and metal detecting equipment is first installed the persons placing it in operation must be qualified and competent to do so. This equipment must be calibrated and checked to verify the performance of each unit of equipment. Tests to ensure that it is operating to the specifications set out in the suppliers' operational manual should be adhered to.

The organisation is required to ensure that appropriate calibration, inspection and test equipment is available to personnel for the safe operation of all operating equipment and material.

When any new equipment is installed records should cover the installation and all checks carried out, together with their results. The records should show that the equipment is working correctly.

When an incident involving aviation security has occurred the organisation should carry out tests on equipment and facilities that may have been used for, or in connection with, pre-flight security screening. This would include instances of unauthorised articles being found in the possession of screened persons, unlawfully on board an aircraft or in the possession of a passenger at the termination of a flight. In such cases, tests should be carried out on screening equipment as soon as practicable after the incident becomes known, to ascertain if any screening equipment is faulty. The test would also include checking the integrity of other procedures such as sterile area searches, screening point security, and aircraft searches where any of these may have been involved.

#### A.5 Screening of the person

The purpose of subjecting a person to security screening is to prevent unauthorised articles being carried on to an aircraft.

All passengers on every international flight and all persons including persons in wheel chairs or otherwise assisted, entering a sterile area should be screened by security personnel, unless the person is exempted or refuses to be screened.

The examination may be carried out by personal hand search or with electronic aids or a combination of both in accordance with section 12 of the Aviation Crimes Act 1972.

This policy will also apply to any other flight when, for any reason, passenger screening of that flight is required by the Director.

Security personnel when checking any person must satisfy themselves that the person is not carrying or in possession of any unauthorised articles.

## A.6 Screening by X-ray

The purpose of screening baggage by X-ray is to prevent unauthorised articles being introduced on board aircraft.

No aircraft operator should operate an international air transport passenger service unless all passenger's carry-on luggage has been subjected to baggage security screening by a hand search or X-ray to ensure that no unauthorised article is carried in that baggage. This will also apply to any other flight where for any reason the screening of hand baggage for that flight has been requested by the Director.

Security officers when checking items by hand should satisfy themselves that the items do not contain any unauthorised articles. Carry-on baggage is to be examined in a systematic manner. When an item is removed from baggage, it is to be checked before placing it aside and moving to the next item. Where an article is wrapped or sealed it must be opened for examination unless otherwise satisfactorily cleared.

Screening personnel should always be alert for;

(a) carry-on baggage and other items which appear unusually heavy;

- (b) false bottoms in carry-on baggage or containers;
- (c) computers, calculators, cameras and similar devices which can be used to conceal weapons or explosives;
- (d) more than one unauthorised article; or
- (e) weapons and devices broken down into components.
- (f) It is not necessary to identify each object viewed on the screen. However, it is necessary to determine what is viewed does not represent a threat.

Where any item cannot be positively identified by X-ray as not containing an item that is a threat, or where any doubt exists, the bag must be opened and the contents physically examined. Where other than high definition X-ray equipment is being used, the number of items to be physically searched should be increased accordingly.

#### A.7 Hand search of carry-on baggage

**Security clearance of computers and similar items**— While X-ray examination will not harm the type of equipment envisaged, passengers may not accept this fact and at times refuse to have such items examined by X-ray.

Some items such as lap-top computers and similar items of electronic equipment are difficult to security clear by physical examination.

In view of these factors the following guideline is issued in respect of the security screening of items which are difficult to clear with other than a combination of physical and X-ray examination:

- (a) No item is permitted to be carried in the cabin of an aircraft that has not been satisfactorily examined and security cleared by security personnel. Bearing in mind that electronic equipment can be used to conceal explosive devices and weapons, special attention should be given to such items:
- (b) Where any item can not be satisfactorily security cleared by either physical or X-ray examination, it must not be permitted beyond the screening point:
- (c) Computers, complex video cameras and similar items may be difficult to satisfactorily security clear by physical examination without the aid of X-ray assistance:
- (d) Where a passenger declines to have the item X-ray examined the security officer should endeavour to hand examine the item and request the passenger to operate the equipment.

# A.8 Relinquishment of items — disposal action

Relinquished items should be classified as one of three classes:

- (a) Unauthorised articles, prohibited for carriage by Section 11 of the Aviation Crimes Act 1972, which should be handed to the NZ Police:
- (b) Dangerous goods which are prohibited for carriage on board aircraft by Part 92:
- (c) Items which are a security risk if carried in the cabin of the aircraft, but which may be carried as hold-stow baggage and handed back to the passenger at the end of the journey.

Security officers, when seizing an unauthorised article, must do so with due regard for their own safety. Weapons should be held in the X-ray unit until emergency action can be taken. Weapons found on a person are to be quickly seized where practicable and in such a manner as to prevent the offending person from using such items. Weapons should be handed to the Police, together with the passenger where it appears an offence is disclosed.

The correct documentation must be used, with particular care taken, where a person is transferring to another flight at some point of their immediate travel.

#### A.9 Surveillance of persons being screened

The purpose of surveillance of persons being screened is to identify persons whose appearance or demeanor indicates that they may pose a higher security risk and to ensure they have no unauthorised articles in their possession.

It is essential that persons being security screened are kept under surveillance so that anyone acting suspiciously is identified. More intensive search practices should be applied to this passenger and their hand baggage. In these circumstances, consideration should be given to locating and searching the passenger's hold-stow baggage.

Passengers should be monitored from the time of screening until boarding processes are completed to ensure there is no mix of screened and unscreened persons and that no person has the opportunity to pass any unauthorised article to any passenger.

#### A.10 Breaches of security screening

The purpose of contingency planning is to ensure that planned action is taken where it is suspected that the integrity of the screening processes have been breached.

Contingency plans for situations where the security integrity of screening has been breached, should be prepared and promulgated to security personnel.

Where passengers subject to security control have mixed with, or had any contact with unscreened persons after screening, the plan is to ensure that all persons beyond the screening point are re-screened and the area is re-searched to confirm that no unauthorised articles have been left in the sterile area.

Where any person is detected unlawfully in a sterile area or unlawfully on board an aircraft, and a mix has not occurred, then it will be sufficient to search the area(s) at risk.

## A.11 Screening point emergencies—action plans and alarms

The purpose of emergency plans and alarms is for the appropriate action to be taken when an emergency occurs at the screening point.

Emergency planning for incidents at the screening point must assure the safety of passengers, crews, ground staff, the public and law enforcement officers.

Planning will include actions to be taken in armed offender or bomb threat situations.

When any serious incident occurs at the screening point action should be taken to stop the flow of passengers and if reasonably possible, assist in evacuating the area.

Covert alarms sounding back to the Airport Police Station, aerodrome operators emergency control rooms (if applicable), and security base should be available at each screening point.

In circumstances where a weapon or suspected device is identified on the X-ray monitor, planning should include keeping the passenger concerned separated from the suspect item. Holding the weapon within the X-ray unit until Police support is available is a recommended practice.

Planning is required to cover the action to be taken to prevent injury or death to staff and passengers where any person produces a weapon at, or before reaching, the screening point in circumstances that indicate that they may be an armed offender.

Planning is also to include action, to be taken in circumstances where a suspected explosive device has been discovered.

#### A.12 Mobile patrol

The purpose of a mobile patrol is for the detection and apprehension of offenders and to give immediate response to security related incidents within the security area or elsewhere as appropriate.

Mobile patrols must be maintained on a 24 hour basis (at Auckland, Christchurch and Wellington International Airports), for the detection and apprehension of persons who may be a threat to the security of operations and to provide an immediate response to security related incidents within the security area and elsewhere as appropriate, including designated air navigation installations outside the perimeter.

**Perimeter Inspection** — The purpose of a perimeter inspection is to give security coverage to all security fencing, barriers, buildings and facilities forming the security area boundary of the aerodrome, on an irregular basis to deter unauthorised access and to respond to any incident or suspected incident of unauthorised access.

Cargo/Freight Areas — The purpose of patrolling cargo and freight areas is to support operators in their responsibility for security of such areas. Only authorised vehicles and persons with current and valid identification cards as laid down in Part 19, who are carrying out normal lawful duties, are permitted in security areas where cargo and freight are being handled.

**Air Navigation Facility** — The purpose of patrolling air navigation facilities is to minimise the risk of unlawful interference to the facility and to provide some security protection for personnel working within such facilities.

Air navigation installations which are designated security air navigation facilities by the Minister should be included in patrol activity.

## A.13 Check point security

**Access Control Tasks** — The purpose of access control is to ensure only authorised persons, authorised vehicles, or embarking passengers, pass into security or operational areas through points of controlled access.

All access control points should have a sign or signs warning people that only authorised persons should be permitted to pass such points. The penalty for non-compliance should be displayed.

The applicable law is provided in:

- (a) Sections 51 and 84 of the Civil Aviation Act 1990;
- (b) Civil Aviation Rules 19.353, 19.355 and 19.357; and

(c) Section 3 of the Trespass Act 1980 supported by Section 56 of the Crimes Act 1961.

A communication system for the purpose of providing a quick response from the security management of the unit and/or Police should be provided.

Security personnel on duty at any check point must ensure that only persons with current and valid identification cards or documentation, embarking passengers or duly authorised vehicles are allowed access to security or operational areas beyond that point.

#### A.14 Random security spot checks

The purpose of randomly checking vehicles and persons in designated security areas is to identify persons or vehicles that may have gained unauthorised access and to act as a deterrent to gaining entry without the necessary identification and authorisation.

Security personnel must carry out random checks of persons and vehicles in security or operational areas to identify any person or vehicle that has gained unauthorised entry and to deter other acts of unauthorised entry.

#### A.15 Verification—ID cards and licences

The validity of identification cards may be verified from the Civil Aviation Authority data base. The Aviation Security Service also have full access to this data.

Particulars of all flight crew licenses issued in New Zealand are entered in the Civil Aviation Authority data base. This system ensures:

- (a) rapid and positive identification of issued cards:
- (b) that immediate cancellation of lost/stolen identity cards can be achieved:
- (c) that the particulars of pilot licences can be verified.

Security personnel monitoring identification cards and pilot licences used for access purposes, should check with the Civil Aviation Authority if any doubt exists as to the validity of the documentation. This will also identify if the card or licence has been reported lost or stolen, or is otherwise invalid.

## A.16 Security escorts

The aviation security management are required to provide security escorts within security areas of security designated aerodromes for the prevention of unlawful interference to aircraft, aircraft operations, aviation facilities and for the security of persons therein.

Officers are required to escort vehicles and persons efficiently and safely within movement areas. Also refer to the requirements of the Aerodrome Operators Drivers Permit Scheme (if applicable at that aerodrome). Part of the escort duties requires the driver of the vehicle and/or the person being escorted being briefed by the security officer conducting the escort. This briefing is to include clear instructions to always follow the escorting vehicle. A printed handout may be used to assist in briefings.

The purpose of an escort is to ensure that persons and vehicles that need to be in a security area, but are not normally employed there, will not cause any danger of injury or damage to any aircraft, persons, or equipment, and to prevent unauthorised access to aircraft.

Escorts should be provided whenever there is any doubt whether a person's authority and/or training is sufficient to guarantee the safety of aircraft within the security or operational area of the airport.

There must in all cases be a sufficient and valid reason for the person or vehicle to have access to the security area.

### A.17 Foot patrols

The purpose of a foot patrol is for the detection and apprehension of offenders who may be a threat to security operations and to give immediate response to security related incidents within the security area or elsewhere as appropriate.

Foot patrols should be carried out, covering areas of aerodromes vulnerable to security incidents. These foot patrols should be of an irregular nature and the timing of visits to buildings and facilities should vary.

Security personnel should be alert to and prevent passengers using the wrong route to aircraft and engaging in other dangerous practices. While immediate action to avoid danger must be taken, where a lack of air operator supervision of passengers between aircraft and terminals has contributed to the problem, the details of the incident should be reported and brought to the notice of the air operator by the security management of the unit.

## A.18 Aircraft security

Security personnel are required to keep all international aircraft under general surveillance with direct attention being paid to such aircraft under final preparation for departure.

The main purpose of carrying out security patrols of aircraft parking areas is to deter any unauthorised person from approaching or having the opportunity to interfere with the aircraft or introduce any unauthorised article into or onto the aircraft

The aircraft operator has the prime responsibility for the security of their aircraft. It is their responsibility to ensure that stairs or air-bridges are removed and aircraft access doors secured.

The aircraft should be parked in an illuminated area. The aerodrome operator has the responsibility for providing lighting of aircraft parking areas.

Where any aircraft is found unattended and not secured, or the stairs or air bridge not removed, the aerodrome operator should be advised and requested to attend to the problem.

A walk-round visual inspection of the aircraft should be included in the security visits with particular attention being given to those areas where a person or device could be readily concealed.

In addition to the action taken in the previous paragraphs, if any other factor gives cause for concern that the aircraft has been interfered with, then the operator's representative should be requested to attend and be advised of the cause/s for concern.

#### A.19 Patrol vehicles

Patrol vehicles provided should be adequate for the task and reliable.

They should be equipped with radios capable of clear transmission and reception over all areas of operations.

They should also be equipped with warning lights, torches, spotlights, fire extinguishers, heavy chains and padlocks, and first aid equipment.

## A.20 Intelligence and information

"Intelligence" may be defined as the end product of a continuous series of activities, collection, evaluation, collation, and analysis directed toward converting raw information into informed judgements which may be immediately or potentially significant to security planning.

"Information" may be defined as being information received from official or unofficial sources which because of its source, or means of communication or any other reason, has not or may not have been evaluated by official intelligence process, but which may be required to be taken into consideration for security planning.

Aviation security service organisations may receive intelligence or other information from the Police, the Civil Aviation Authority, the Security Intelligence Service, airlines, any overseas agency, or other source.

If the intelligence or information is not received from the Civil Aviation Authority, it should be communicated to them immediately regardless of the source. However, any security classification must be respected and the information treated accordingly.

The information may only be released to other individuals or organisations on a "need to know" basis and to those who are entitled to receive it, taking its classification into consideration.

The information should only be promulgated to individuals or agencies that are cleared to receive it and then on a "need to know" basis.

#### A.21 Liaison with other agencies

Contingency planning requires advance preparation for the protection of vulnerable points or the provision of alternative services or supplies maintained as a safeguard against sabotage or other emergency situations.

It is essential when developing such plans that security management involved in contingency planning must consult and liaise with all other airport organisations.

Formal liaison may be facilitated through the airport security committee, or the emergency sub-committee.

Security management of the unit must ensure sufficient information is given to other organisations to motivate vigilance on the part of their personnel and promote feed-back.

# A.22 Aviation security officer—medical requirements

This provision requires the holder of an aviation security certificate to ensure that all applicants for the position of an aviation security officer are assessed as fit to carry out the functions and duties of an aviation security officer.

For compliance, procedures need to be documented detailing the need for applicants to be assessed, based on a general medical examination, as fit to carry out the functions and duties of an aviation security officer.

For the purpose of assessing the fitness of applicants (or of employees, when a problem seems to arise) the certificate holder is welcome to elect to use the Civil Aviation Authority's

appointed Designated Medical Examiners and Aviation Medical Assessors, along with the forms and documentation provided for their use.

It is considered satisfactory, as a means of compliance, to base the examination and assessment on the system which exists for air traffic controllers, via Rule Part 67. The medical examination form would need to cover those subjects required by the Class 3 medical standards in 67.59, subject to the exceptions detailed below. A suitable form exists as CAA 24067/250.

- (a) The following exceptions from Class 3 standards would apply:
  - (i) **CARDIORESPIRATORY**: The work is not sedentary, and requires a similar level of physical fitness to police and rescue fire. Therefore, *freedom from obesity* should be required (less than 20% estimated body fat), and appropriate care should be taken in assessing the cardiovascular, respiratory and musculoskeletal systems:
- (ii) **MEDICATION**: The use of beta blocker drugs is contra-indicated in view of their effects on exercise tolerance. At initial assessment, regular drug treatment such as for hypertension may make the applicant undesirable as an employment risk:
- (iii) **DISTANCE VISION**: Distance vision (corrected or uncorrected) should be no worse than 6/12 in each eye separately.

If correction is required, spectacles could be permitted provided that uncorrected vision is no worse than 6/36 in each eye separately.

Where uncorrected vision is worse than 6/36 in either eye, suitable contact lenses could be permitted in order to achieve the required standard:

- (iv) **NEAR VISION**: The applicant should be able to read N14 or better at 100 cm distance, and N5 or better at 33 cm distance with or without correction:
- (v) **COLOUR PERCEPTION**: Although the standard is as for Class 3, the reasons differ. Normal colour perception should be required. This is because of requirements regarding court evidence. The standard relates to credibility of an officer's court evidence (not merely to safety). The footnote to section 11 of the form re *additional colour tests required* refers to Rescue Fire, and is not relevant to Aviation Security:
- (vi) **HEARING**: Hearing aids should not be permitted. The audiogram is not part of the assessment standard, but is important as a pre-employment baseline in view of the noise of the aviation environment:
- (vii) A normal sense of smell should be required. This is not normally tested for a CAA Medical Certificate, so the examiner would have to provide for this, with 3 test bottles:
- (viii) On the ASSESSMENT form, no RESTRICTIONS or expiry date apply. But full comments should be written of the type suitable for release to the employing service (no medical confidential details).

It is recommended that the holder also have procedures to provide reasonable assurance that aviation security officers continue to meet these standards during their term of employment.

# A.24 Recurrent testing

Recurrent testing is to be carried out by the certificate holder to ensure that all staff employed on security screening duties are proficient in carrying out the different functions of; metal

detection, X-ray image and colour identification, physical search of persons and baggage, and sterile area and aircraft search.

Testing is designed to assess the integrity of pre-board security screening procedures and is to be structured to ensure that the staff member being tested has a reasonable opportunity to detect the test objects.

The structure of the test must give the staff member a reasonable opportunity to detect the test objects amongst contents of baggage typical of that normally carried by passengers.

**Testing Procedures**—The test courier can proceed through in the normal manner, or be seated or carried in a conveyance (i.e. wheelchair or pram). The standard test piece can be concealed on the courier or placed in or on any conveyance used.

If no walk-through metal detector is available or is not being used for any reason, the examiner will determine whether the staff member using a hand wand and/or conducting a physical search, locates and identifies the test object.

The examiner conducting the test will randomly place the standard test piece amongst other items being security screened. The standard test piece can be placed in a carry-on bag or separately on the conveyer belt with other items such as duty free goods, papers and books. The standard test piece can also be placed in items which the examiner has demanded be passed around and physically hand searched (i.e. Cameras, video cameras, film safety packs).

The examiner should determine if the staff member being tested responds, locates and identifies the standard test piece by correctly identifying the image or colour on the X-ray monitor, and then locates the standard test piece during the subsequent hand search.

The test should also include assessment of the officers judgement as to the need for hand search, because of mass/colour/confusion, the contents cannot be clearly identified.

**Physical Search** — All staff members involved in physical searches of carry-on items and hold-stow baggage should be subjected to the test. The examiner conducting the test should randomly place the standard test piece amongst other items being security screened. The standard test piece should not be in plain sight when the bag is opened. The placement of the standard test piece should be detected by a routine physical search.

**Request for Hand Search** — The courier carrying out the test will request the staff member on handling duties to hand search sensitive material in his carry-on baggage. This is an accepted procedure. The standard test piece should not be in plain sight when the bag or container is opened. The placement of the standard test piece should be detected by a routine physical hand search.

**Sterile Area Search** — All staff members involved in sterile area searches should be subjected to testing. The examiner conducting the test will place the standard test piece in any part of the sterile area accessible to departing passengers prior to search. The placing of the standard test piece should be confined to an area between the screening point and passenger access to an aircraft.. The examiner will determine if the staff member being tested locates the concealed test object while conducting the sterile area search.

**Aircraft Search** — All staff members involved in aircraft searches should be subjected to testing. The examiner conducting the test will place the standard test piece in any part of the aircraft to be searched. For the purpose of the test, the standard test piece is to be placed in an area of the aircraft to which the travelling public normally have access. The examiner will determine if the staff members being tested locate the concealed test object while conducting the aircraft search.

**Standard Test Pieces** — For the purpose of testing, all test pieces will theoretically represent the real thing and therefore represent objects that pose a real threat to life and property.

The placement of more than one test piece in any item is common practice to test the depth of search proficiency.

For the purpose of testing and re-testing, different types of standard test pieces will be used over a period of time. Testing will be carried out on persons performing any or all security screening functions. The rate of success or failure in detecting standard test pieces will be used to measure individual staff and team proficiency. This measure will determine if the standards are being maintained, or what follow-up action is required to achieve the standard.

The security provider's security management will be required to have those who failed the test attend corrective training and be further tested to prove that they can meet the standard before they are permitted to return to duty on the tasks for which they have failed the test.

Details of the corrective training and the results of tests are to be recorded for audit purposes.

If the test is failed whilst processing an actual flight, the facts should be brought to the notice of the security provider's operational management. After consultation between security management and the affected airlines, consideration should be given to having all passengers, sterile area and aircraft re-processed by competent persons.

The security provider's management should ensure that if any security officer fails to pass the test or meet the required standard that they are not employed on any screening duties.

**Test Courier Brief** — The test courier should not be told of the nature of the test or the make up of the test object. It should be made clear to the courier that in the unlikely event of the test object not being detected, it will be recovered by the examiner beyond the screening point. If the courier or bag containing the standard test piece is required to be searched by screening staff, the courier is to co-operate and assist as required.

Recurrent testing should not be carried out if it will cause delays to scheduled flights.